Dodô (Milan vs. Roma)

After starting in the mid-week defeat at home to Chievo, Dodô retained his place for Roma’s Week 37 match at the San Siro, against Milan.

Starting Position

Dodô (27), Leandro Castán (5), Marquinho (7), Simone Perrotta (20), Kevin-Prince Boateng (10), Mattia De Sciglio (2), Mathieu Flamini (16)

Dodô spent the whole 90 minutes he was on the pitch at left full-back. Roma were set up in a 4-4-1-1 system. He was ambitious in possession and adopted a high position. Marquinho played ahead of him and was tucked inside.

Ambitious runs forward

Despite lining up as a full-back, Dodô was actually more like a wing-back. Roma’s back four – also including Marquinhos, Nicolás Burdisso and Leandro Castán, were slightly lob-sided, as a result. To ensure they remained balanced, Marquinhos was fairly reserved at right full-back, while Simone Perrotta would position himself deep on Roma’s inside left to cover the space left by Dodô, when Milan attacked. Dodô constantly looked to get forward. He signalled his intentions in the open 30 seconds of the contest, when he broke in behind Mattia De Sciglio, before seeing his cut-back smothered by Christian Abbiati. With Marquinho equally offensive, but going forward from a more central position, the wing was opened up for Dodô to attack. As the diagram shows, Dodô did more attacking than defending and had considerably more possession in the oppositions half than his own. He was helped by Kevin Prince-Boateng’s inconsistent tracking back, while De Sciglio was also ambitious with forward runs and that too would occasionally leave space.

Milan focus right – mixed support from Marquinho

Dodô’s adventurousness was a key offensive weapon for Roma, but it left them vulnerable at the back. His foray’s forward created space in behind for Milan to exploit. As mentioned above, Perrotta would cover across to plug the gap, but he was not always able to do so. With Mathieu Flamini making forward runs, he would often occupy Perrotta. Boateng, Milan’s wide forward on the right, would usually come inside and be picked up by Castán, leaving space for De Sciglio to push forward from right full-back. Marquinho worked very hard going forward – he made some good late runs into the area, but was less enthusiastic when it came to defending. His tracking back was mixed and this let De Sciglio get forward quite frequently.

With Marquinhos sitting deep on their left, Milan’s attack was largely focused down the right. The diagram below shows this, with Boateng and De Sciglio the Rossoneri’s most influential players in the first half.

However, despite this, Milan didn’t fully exploit the space available to them. This was in part due to their lethargic build up, which allowed Dodô to recover his position. De Sciglio delivered some dangerous crosses, but there was no real outstanding openings created.

Good defending

While Dodô was ambitious with his forward runs, he didn’t shirk his defensive responsibilities. Throughout the contest he defended impressively. Only Michael Bradley (5) made more tackles for Roma than the Brazilian (4), while he also made the most interceptions (4). He had the most effective clearances (3) and only committed two fouls. When the opportunity arose, he pressed Boateng high up and looked to overturn possession quickly. He didn’t stand off his opponent, preferring to tackle sharply. This method of defending proved to be effective, especially in the second half when he could take more risks pressing. He kept his focus and composure for much of the contest, aside from some petty moments involving Mario Balotelli, which eventually led to him getting yellow carded.

Mixed end product

Throughout the match, Dodô’s forward runs were relentless and he got himself into good positions around the Milan area. As the diagram shows, he had a lot of possession in the final third, but his delivery was inconsistent. This was particularly an issue in the first half, when he was most prominent. There was some neat interplay with Marquinho, but the final ball was often lacking.

Milan down to ten men – change shape

Dodô (27), Marquinho (7), Simone Perrotta (20), Leandro Castán (5), Mario Balotelli (45), Mathieu Flamini (16), Mattia De Sciglio (2)

With Sulley Muntari’s dismissal in the first half, Milan Coach Massimilano Allegri had to change shape. The alterations he made should have created more space for Dodô to push forward and have a greater influence in the final third, but he was strangely ineffective, as Roma struggled to capitalise on their man advantage. Allegri moved Boateng to fill Muntari’s midfield role on the inside left. Balotelli stayed as a lone striker, with Stephan El Shaarawy positioned more centrally. On the right, Flamini stayed narrow, leaving the wing open for De Sciglio to push forward and provide the width. This left space for Dodô and Marquinho to exploit, as mentioned above. With Marquinho running at De Sciglio, there was opportunities for Dodô to overlap. However, only on one occasion did they exploit this, with Dodô’s run forward taking De Sciglio away and opening space for Marquinho to cross, but the chance came to nothing.

Balotelli drifting right – causing problems

With De Sciglio Milan’s only real outlet on the right, Balotelli started drifting wide and caused Dodô some problems. Balotelli ran the right channel effectively and was able to get Milan high up the pitch and pin Dodô back. With Flamini staying central, Dodô had been able to press De Sciglio high up. On a few occasions, he overturned possession and broke into the space behind the full-back. Once Balotelli started coming wide, Dodô was not able to do this. Balotelli’s runs also created more space inside of Dodô, which Flamini exploited and forced a good save from Bogdan Lobonț. This threat disappeared when Flamini was replaced by Giampaolo Pazzini, as Allegri chased the victory. The midfielder’s departure also left even more space for Dodô. In the closing moments, the Brazilian was able to break forward and test Abbiati with a shot from the edge of the area.

Roger Espinoza (Wigan Athletic vs. Swansea City)

With Maynor Figueroa and Jean Beausejour unavailable, Wigan Athletic manager Roberto Martínez selected Roger Espinoza at left full-back to face Swansea City.

Starting Position

Roger Espinoza (18), Shaun Maloney (10), Dwight Tiendalli (21), Àngel Rangel (22)

Espinoza played at left full-back in a 4-3-3, of sorts. At times, the system would change to a 3-5-2, with Ben Watson dropping between the two centre-backs, Gary Caldwell and Paul Scharner. This only happened when Wigan were in possession and Espinoza’s position remained the same in both systems.

Nervous start

Perhaps, due to playing out of position, Espinoza made a nervous start to the contest. He over-hit a pass back to Scharner that allowed Wayne Routledge to get in behind and force a save from Joel. Some of his tackling was a little uncontrolled and he required cover from Shaun Maloney to protect against the attacking instincts of Dwight Tiendalli. Scharner also came wide to protect the left-flank when Wayne Routledge drifting out to that side of the pitch from the centre. In possession, he seemed hesitant and a little ponderous.

Growing confidence

After a difficult start, Espinoza began to come into the contest. He was getting higher up the pitch and forcing Àngel Rangel back. Wigan as a team also began to take control of the game, with particular focus on attacking down their left. With some good interplay between Espinoza and Maloney, Wigan were able to have spells of sustained pressure. By pressing high up, Espinoza was not only able to pin Rangel and Tiendalli back, but also overturn possession in good areas of the pitch.

Espinoza’s growing impact on the game is clearly visibly on the diagram below. The full-back was Wigan’s most influential player between the 15th and 45th minute. The diagram also shows that Wigan’s attacks were focused largely down their left.

Pushing high up

Out of possession, Espinoza was positioned as a left full-back, but when Wigan had the ball, he was more like a wing-back. He pushed high up the pitch to support the attack. Maloney would move in-field, opening the wing up for Espinoza to overlap. The Honduran was able to be ambitious because Swansea had Rangel – orthodoxly a right full-back, deployed at right-midfield. He didn’t press to0 high on Espinoza, preferring to sit in front of Tiendalli and give protection to the full-back, in an attempt to close out Maloney. Occasionally, particularly in the first half, Espinoza’s high starting position would leave him caught up field, with Swansea able to get in behind him. If this was the case, then Scharner would move across to cover the vacated space. He did this reasonably well in the first half.

Espinoza was successful in pushing forward and getting to the byline. Unfortunately, his end product was often inconsistent, while there was also a lack of options in the area, Arouna Koné aside. The diagram below shows this, with Espinoza working his way up the pitch well, before been let down in the final third.

As well offering a good offensive outlet, by pushing high up, Espinoza was able to press and overturn possession in advanced areas. As the diagram below shows, he did this quite effectively. Sometimes, however, in attempting to close quickly, he would miss the challenge and be caught ahead of the ball with Swansea able to break.

Goal

Espinoza’s continued attempts to get forward were rewarded with the opening goal on the stroke of half-time. As mentioned above, in possession, he played more as wing-back and constantly backed up the play. The goal was well finished – a good show of technique, and was reflective of Espinoza’s growing confidence and influence as the first half progressed.

GIF courtesy of Feint Zebra
http://www.feintzebra.co.uk/football/goal-gif-roger-espinoza-wigan-1-0-swansea/

Not a full-back – error for Swansea equaliser

While Swansea were wary of Espinoza’s threat when coming forward – hence the selection of Rangel in midfield, they were also aware that he was not an orthodox full-back and could be exploited. On a couple of occasions in the first half, they were able to get in behind Espinoza, who didn’t always seem aware of the runners around him. A good interchange between Rangel and Tiendalli got the latter in behind, while in another instance Tiendalli was able to get beyond Espinoza, with the Honduran realising too late. While Wigan got away with this in the first half, it would cost them in the second, as Swansea equalised. Routledge turned outside the area on the inside left and fired a pass over Espinoza for the on-rushing Rangel to fire into the net. Espinoza was caught ball-watching and completely unaware of Rangel’s run in behind him.

It is perhaps unfair to be too critical of Espinoza – he’s not a full-back. However, he was getting caught out in the same way with some frequency. Swansea creating good openings from it seemed inevitable and it was no surprised that in behind Espinoza was the route to their opening goal.

Battle with Rangel/partnership with Maloney

Espinoza’s duel with Rangel was an interesting one that lasted the whole contest. Both combinations on that side of the pitch – Espinoza and Maloney, Rangel and Tiendalli, played as partnerships and did pretty well. Ultimately, it was the Swansea duo who came out on top, with both finding the next, but Maloney and Espinoza worked well together, both defensively and offensively. Going forward, Maloney would come inside, with Espinoza pushing wide and trying to get to the byline. They constantly linked up – Maloney to Espinoza was Wigan’s second more frequent pass combination, trying to get in behind their opposite number. Out of possession, Maloney would drop on top of Espinoza and usually goal-side of Rangel.

Six Thoughts On: Miguel Britos (Napoli vs. Inter)

Miguel Britos retained his usual place in the Napoli back three for the visit of Inter to the Stadio San Paolo.

Starting Position

Miguel Britos (5), Camilo Zúñiga (18), Marek Hamšík (17), Jonathan (42), Marco Benassi (24), Ricardo Álvarez (11)

Britos was positioned on the left of a back three. He remained in this role until the 86th minute, when Napoli Coach Walter Mazzarri reverted to a 4-4-2 (see below).

Comfortable start

Napoli controlled the opening exchanges – they took the lead after three minutes, and as such Britos was largely untroubled. He had to track a Ricky Álvarez run and defend a corner (he was detailed to mark Cristian Chivu), but his only real involvement in the early part of the contest came when in possession. The most frequent recipient of his passes was Velon Behrami (see below), while he occasionally linked up with Camilo Zúñiga. When Napoli had possession he deep areas, he would push wide to a left full-back position to open up the pitch and allow Zúñiga to position himself higher up.

No reference point

With no fit strikers, Inter Coach Andrea Stramaccioni had to adjust his system. He chose to match up with Napoli’s 3-5-2 and used Álvarez and Fredy Guarín – orthodoxly  midfielders, as forwards. Both, however, would come from deeper positions to run at the Napoli defence, rather than playing up against them.

Without a reference point to focus on, Britos had long periods under little pressure. This allowed him to move wider and support Zúñiga when Jonathan got high up the pitch. With the Inter’s forward’s dropping deep, Behrami had to hold and protect the defence, making six tackles. In contrast, with no direct opponent, Britos made only two.

Having no obvious reference point did give Britos one problem – runners from deep. There was an instance in the first half where Álvaro Pereira, cutting across from the right, was able to receive possession on the edge of the Napoli box, before turning Britos and forcing Morgan De Sanctis into a save. The defender’s main concern from deep, however, was Álvarez. The Argentinian not only took up a withdrawn starting position to run at Britos, but also dragged him wide. On occasion this would create space for Marco Benassi to run in to, but he rarely exploited it. For the second half, Benassi was replaced by Esteban Cambiasso, with Zdravko Kuzmanović coming to the right. He was more ambitious than Benassi with his forward runs, but struggled to find space beyond Britos.

Dealing with Álvarez

Álvarez was Inter’s main threat and could have caused Britos more problems had the Nerazzurri been able to get higher up the pitch more frequently and push Napoli back. With Álvarez not playing directly up against Britos, the defender had to pick his moments to press and close him tightly. In the main, he did this well. When Álvarez came wide, Britos would close him quickly and was able to either win possession (he made three interceptions, more than any other Napoli player) or force him back. With the cover of Paolo Cannavaro and Behrami, Britos could press Álvarez without leaving space in behind. However, on an occasion when that protection wasn’t there, Álvarez was able to exploit it and create Inter’s equaliser (see below).

In the second half, Guarín moved out to the right, swapping with Álvarez. His movement was more predictable and he didn’t cause Britos many problems.

Caught out for Inter equaliser

With Cannavaro caught out of position, Inter broke with Mateo Kovačić running at the defence. Behrami, normally the protection in front of the back three, was also caught high up and was trying to recover to fill the gap left by Cannavaro, which allowed Kovačić to carry the ball unchallenged. This left Britos exposed, with both Kovačić and Álvarez running at him. With Zuniga also too wide, Álvarez could run on to Kovačić’ pass between him and Britos and was eventually fouled.

Without cover, Britos was caught between closing Kovačić and watching Álvarez. In the end, he was able to do neither.

This was the only time Inter got in behind Britos and Napoli, in what was otherwise a fairly comfortable evening defensively for the Partenopei.

The diagram shows how Britos was left exposed.

Miguel Britos (5), Velon Behrami (85), Camilo Zúñiga (18), Mateo Kovačić (10), Ricardo Álvarez (11)

You can also see the goal here: 

Playing out from the back

With Hugo Campagnaro missing – the defender usually used to play out of defence, Napoli had to alter the way they built from the back. Behrami, or sometimes even Hamšík, would drop to receive the ball and move Napoli forward. All three defenders rarely passed expansively as a result. This meant that Britos’ use of the ball was quite simple and by playing passes that were risk-free, he rarely conceded possession. The diagram below highlights this and shows that his passes were almost always short and sideways. On the few occasions when he was more expansive, he usually conceded possession. Britos was allowed to play like this because Inter didn’t press high up and let Napoli build from the back.

Late position change

With Napoli 3-1 ahead, Mazzarri introduced Lorenzo Insigne for the final four minutes and altered his system to a 4-4-2. This meant a readjustment in defence. Zuniga dropped to left full-back. Rolando, who had replaced Alessandro Gamberini, moved to right full-back and Britos tucked inside to partner Cannavaro in the centre.

Napoli already had the result secured and Britos had little more than a watching brief for the closing minutes.